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The Eastern tuna and billfish fishery (ETBF) is currently managed through an input quota 
system  based  on  individual  transferable  effort  units  (the  number  of  hooks)  and  a  total 
allowable effort level (i.e. total number of hooks) A spatial management policy based on a 
series of differential hook-penalties has been proposed as a flexible tool to discourage vessels 
operating in certain areas (e.g. those with high bycatch potential) and encourage operating in 
other areas (e.g. with less bycatch potential). In this study, the importance of catch rates per 
hook  to  location  choice  is  assessed  through  the  estimation  of  a  nested  multinomial  logit 
model.  Other  variables  in  the  model  include  distance  to  the  location,  prices  of  the  main 
species, fuel prices and vessel characteristics. The effects of increasing hook penalties in key 
areas on fishing effort in those areas  and elsewhere are assessed.  Implications for vessel 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Increased understanding of the spatial structure of marine ecosystems and the factors that 
influence the spatial distribution of fisheries has resulted in increased interest in the use of 
spatial management techniques, particularly – but not exclusively – marine protected areas 
(MPAs)  (Wilen  2004).  In  Australia,  conservation-driven  spatial  management  measures 
arising from marine bioregional planning are increasingly affecting fisheries through closure 
of areas to fishing. MPAs are becoming a favoured management strategy for the conservation 
of marine biodiversity within Australia (Manson and Die 2001). In creating MPAs, however, 
there is often a trade off between maximising biodiversity benefits and minimising negative 
economic impacts on the affected fisheries (Manson and Die 2001).  
 
MPAs  are  not  the  only  spatial  management  measure,  and  in  many  cases  alternative 
approaches may provide conservation as well as fishery benefits (Pascoe et al. 2009). The use 
of  spatial  approaches  as  fishery  management  tools  has  been  a  substantial  part  of  the 
management in some Commonwealth fisheries such as the northern prawn fishery (NPF) and 
the southern and eastern shark and scalefish fishery (SESSF) for some time. These have been 
implemented for a variety of reasons ranging from management of environmental impacts to 
ensuring sustainability of harvests.  
 
By  comparison,  spatial  management  is  relatively  new  in  the  Eastern  Tuna  and  Billfish 
Fishery  (ETBF).  Until  recently,  the  fishery  was  managed  through  licence  limitation.  The 
Eastern Tuna and Billfish Fishery Management Plan 2005 introduced a system of statutory 
fishing rights in the form of individual transferable effort quotas based on the number of 
hooks  employed  by  each  vessel,  and  a  corresponding  total  allowable  effort  level  (total 
number of hooks that can be deployed in the fishery). Although developed in 2005 (and 
amended in 2007), this management plan has only recently been fully implemented. SFRs 
were  granted  to  eligible  persons  in  August  2009,  with  the  first  season  under  effort 
management commenced on 1 November 2009 and running over a 16 month period.  
 
Of considerable concern in the fishery is bycatch of highly vulnerable species such as turtles, 
sharks  and  seabirds,  particularly  albatross.  Where  effort  is  deployed  has  different 
implications for catches of these bycatch species. Under the ITE system, a facility has been 
introduced to potentially influence the distribution of effort using “hook decrements” (termed 
sub-area  factors  in  the  management  plan),  which  are  differential  decrement  rates  of  an 
operator’s effort allocation depending on where they fish. As opposed to direct controls, this 
approach relies on an incentive based approach to drive the spatial distribution of effort, as it 
effectively varies the value per hook employed. 
 
The concept of hook decrements is similar to that of the individual habitat quota (Holland and 
Schnier 2006). These are spatial management instruments where different effort penalties are 
applied to different areas based on the level of damage created by fishing in those areas.  
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Damage need not be directly monitored but rather could be a model-based estimate that takes 
into account the type of gear fished and the state of the habitat in the area fished based on a 
virtual habitat model. These quotas are tradeable, allowing vessels to adjust their fishing 
activities to minimise their own damage. Fishers consume their quota based on where and 
when they fish, with the penalty system providing incentives to either operate in areas where 
less damage will be incurred, or adopt fishing gear that will have a lower impact. In the 
proposed  ETBF  management  system,  the  rate  at  which  effort  quota  will  be  consumed 
depends on where and when they fish. Areas and/or seasons with the potential for high levels 
of bycatch of species of concern will attract a high penalty rate, whereas other areas with 
little bycatch may attract a much lower rate.  
 
The effectiveness of such a system will largely be dependent on the degree to which fishers 
respond to changing incentives created by the policy. The spatial hook penalty effectively 
reduces the value per hook associated with fishing in a particular area, making other areas 
potentially more attractive. This will encourage fishers who are able to fish elsewhere, while 
those who chose to continue fishing in the affected area are still able to do so, but the total 
effort  quota  consumed  will  be  increased  (potentially  resulting  in  overall  lower  levels  of 
fishing effort). Of key importance to managers  will be the level of incentive required to 
achieve a given objective, the likely locations to which that displaced effort will shift, and the 
expected effect on fishery economics at a variety of levels from vessel profits to economic 
activity in a port to fishery revenue as a whole. 
 
In this study, a nested multinomial logit model is estimated to determine the importance of 
catch value per hook (VPH) on the location choice of fishers in the ETBF. From this, the 
effects of varying effective VPH on effort levels through inducing hook penalties in both high 
effort  and  low  effort  areas  is  examined.  The  impact  on  economic  performance  is  also 




2. The Eastern Tuna and Billfish Fishery  
 
The Eastern Tuna and Billfish Fishery (ETBF) is a tropical tuna and billfish fishery targeting 
fish in the boundary current off the east of Australia from the tip of Cape York to the South 
Australia-Victoria border (Figure 1). The principal target species are yellowfin tuna (Thunnus 
albacares), albacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga), broadbill swordfish (Xiphias gladius), bigeye 
tuna (Thunnus obesus) and striped marlin (Tetrapturus audax) with the total catch of these 
five species averaging around 6,500 tonnes over the period 2005-06 to 2007-08, with an 
average total value of around $32m (Evans 2007; ABARE 2009a).  
 
Fishing  effort  is  expended  disproportionally  over  the  range  of  the  fishery  (Figure  1a), 
suggesting  both  heterogeneity  in  the  characteristics  of  fishing  locations,  and  fishers  
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responding to this heterogeneity in their location choice. Most fishing  effort is expended 
inshore in the southern and northern extremes of the fishery, although fishing effort extends 
offshore in the central part of the fishery.
1 The fleet is relatively homogeneous across the 
fishery (Table 1) in terms of average vessel size and engine power, although within each 
region there is a mix of smaller and larger vessels. The smaller vessels are more limited in 
their range, tending to predominantly fish inshore. 
 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of total fishing days, 2003-08 (a) all vessels; (b) Mooloolaba vessels 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of the vessels by general region (2003-08) 
Region  Boats 
Share 
of total   Length  Power  Hooks deployed 
    trips  Mean   St Dev  Mean  St Dev  Mean  St Dev 
North Queensland  12  13%  21.3  3.8  418.0  46.8  611.4  187.4 
Central Qld  5  1%  19.9  2.6  347.2  131.0  1046.4  57.9 
Mooloolaba  59  46%  22.1  3.4  368.0  126.2  1148.7  221.6 
Brisbane and Gold Coast  7  4%  20.1  3.9  244.1  130.5  1024.0  184.4 
Northern and Central NSW  13  5%  17.5  2.4  347.2  125.5  939.2  174.5 
Sydney, Newcastle, Wollongong  15  10%  21.0  2.7  357.3  100.6  1039.9  135.9 
Southern NSW  79  21%  21.7  5.4  349.5  145.3  996.0  254.7 
 
The largest single port  is Mooloolaba (Table 1), located on the Sunshine Coast north of 
Brisbane. For practical reasons (given the substantial quantity of data involved), the analysis 
was limited to vessels fishing out of Mooloolaba. These vessels had a similar distribution of 
effort to the fishery as a whole (Figure 1b). Vessels operating out of the southern-most ports 
                                                 
1 The northern, central and southern sectors and their inshore/offshore delineations illustrated in Figure 1 were 
derived for the purposes of the analysis and do not reflect any management boundaries. 
a) All vessels  b) Mooloolaba 
vessels only  
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also operate in the southern bluefin tuna fishery. Hence, their share of total trips in the ETBF 
is substantially lower than those of the Mooloolaba fleet. 
 
3. Modelling fisher location choice 
 
Models of fisher location choice have largely been driven by the increasing use of marine 
protected areas. Closing areas to fishing forces fishers to either move elsewhere or cease 
fishing.  However,  assuming  that  the  fishing  effort  previously  expended  in  an  area  will 
evaporate following the area closure is, more than likely, a naive assumption. Instead, the 
effort will move to the next best available fishing ground.  
 
A difficulty when examining location choice of fishers is that they are not homogeneous – 
vessels are based at different port locations (as well as fish in different locations), and fisher 
and vessel characteristics affects their cost structure. Hence, complications exist – expected 
economic returns are not only determined by revenue of catch (i.e. highest catch rates), but 
also by the costs associated with the fishing trip. Costs increase as distance travelled and 
steaming time increases. As a result, fishers are (within reason) able to select from which port 
they fish and where they land their catch to maximize the returns for species captured. In the 
modelling of spatial dynamics, several assumptions have been proposed. For example, the 
distribution of fishing effort could be assumed to move towards areas of highest catches (i.e. 
reflecting  differences  in  revenues  assuming  constant  costs)  (Maury  and  Gascuel  1999), 
highest catch rates modified for distance to port (i.e. taking into consideration revenues and 
costs implicitly (Sampson 1991) or greatest profit (Bockstael and Opaluch 1984).  
 
A method that allows for heterogeneity in both fishing activity and fisher characteristics is 
discrete choice modelling, or the random utility model (RUM) (McFadden 1974, 1981).
2 The 
key feature of the RUM is that it models discrete decisions with no requisite assumption of 
homogeneity amongst individuals. Rational decisions makers are assumed to make decisions 
that maximise their level of utility subject to any constraints. In the case of effort allocation in 
fisheries, utility is assumed to relate to profitability (subject to any constraints the fisher may 
face), and location choice is based on the expected profitability at each alternative location.  
 
The method is probabilistic in nature in that the model estimates the probability of a fisher 
operating in a given area based on the characteristics of the area (e.g. average revenue per 
unit effort, distance from port etc) and the characteristics of the fisher. This probability is, 
therefore, specific to an individual fisher. The allocation of effort of the individual fisher to 
each  area  is  estimated  as  the  product  of  the  total  effort  expended  by  the  fisher  and  the 
                                                 
2 Recently, increasing attention has also been paid to development of state dependent dynamic programming 
models to estimate fisher behavior (Gillis et al. 1995a; Gillis et al. 1995b; Costello and Polasky 2008; Poos et 
al. 2010). These have an additional advantage in quota based fisheries in that they also allow for the opportunity 
cost of using quota to be taken into account, so that the decision when as well as where to fish can be modelled 
(Costello and Polasky 2008).  
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probability that effort will be applied to each area. The total spatial effort allocation is derived 
by summing the effort in each area of the individual fishers. 
 
Numerous studies have been undertaken in fisheries utilising a RUM approach to estimate 
fisher location choice (Bockstael and Opaluch 1984; Eales and Wilen 1986; Holland and 
Sutinen 1999; Curtis and Hicks 2000; Holland and Sutinen 2000; Smith 2002; Wilen et al. 
2002; Hutton et al. 2004; Pradhan and Leung 2004; Marchal et al. 2009). Most of these 
studies have employed multinomial logit techniques to estimate the model. 
 
3.1 Multinomial logit and nested multinomial logit models 
As in most economic-based choice models, utility is assumed to derive from an individual’s 
choice, while the choice itself is assumed to be made on the basis of the characteristics of the 
option chosen. Different decisions of individuals are treated as independent over time (Smith 
2002). The individual choice (and the derived utility) is assumed to have both a deterministic 
component  and  a  stochastic  error  component  (thereby  giving  the  term  “random  utility 
model”). Utility is typically defined as a (linear) combination of a set of explanatory variables 
that together are surmised to form (for the most part) the non-random components of the 
utility, and a stochastic error component: 
 
  ij j i j ij z U e b + = ,   (1) 
 
where for a given person time-event, i, (such as a fishing trip) choice j (i.e. fishing location) 
is made. The explanatory variables zij can be comprised of attributes of the choice, xij, and 
characteristics of the individual, wi, while bj is the parameter vector to be estimated.  
 
The basic multinomial logit model assumes that all choices are independent of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA). However, alternatives in close proximity to each other most likely share 
the same, or similar, characteristics, and the IIA assumption is likely to be invalid. The nested 
multinomial  logit  (NL)  model  overcomes  this  by  partially  relaxing  the  IIA  assumption 
through allowing for some correlation between sub-sets of alternatives (Hensher et al. 2005). 
The NL is a structural model of the interdependent decisions of where to fish (Smith 2002). 
Several levels of choice may be specified, such as general fishing zone and then area within 
that fishing zone., and the NL allows for different variances at these different nodes (Smith 
2002). 
 
The choice probability of the nested multinomial logit model is defined as the conditional 
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and 
  [ ] ∑ Î =
k j k j j k z K ) exp( ln
' b   (3) 
 
where Kk is the inclusive value for zone k, representing the composite utility of the choices 
within the branch (Holland and Sutinen 1999). 
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where  k t  is the inclusive value variable relating to zone k. The unconditional probability of 




Individual shot level logbook data were available covering the period 2003 to 2008. From 
this, information was available on catch by species, fishing area (latitude and longitude), trip 
length, as well as vessel characteristics (vessel length, power, hooks deployed per shot). Only 
vessels registered to ports in New South Wales (NSW) or Queensland were included in the 
analysis. Vessels either fished for one, two or three days per trip (steaming time was not 
included in the data set, only active fishing time), with most trips being of 2 fishing days 
duration (Table 2). Only one shot per day was taken. Distance (great circle nautical miles) to 
port was estimated for each fishing trip location (defined by the lat and long of each shot). 
Once in an area, distance travelled in multi-shot trips was relatively small (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Distance to home port by trip length 
    Distance travelled (nautical miles) 
trip length (days)  Number of trips  Home to first shot  First to second  Second to third 
1  6,710  193.41     
2  18,554  263.81  31.77   
3  1,631  135.89  27.02  25.01 
Total  26,895       
 
Data were aggregated to a trip level, with the number of days fished each trip retained as a 
variable. The total distance travelled (return trip) was used as a measure of distance to allow 
for multi-day trips.  
 
Price information for the key species was derived from ABARE fisheries and commodity 
statistics (ABARE 2008, 2009a, b). Weekly diesel price information was available from the  
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WA Fuelwatch website.
3 While these data related to Western Australia, a consistent series of 
east coast data at a weekly level were not available. The diesel fuel prices were adjusted by 
the off-road rebate ($0.381 per litre) in place over the period of the data, and the weekly price 




For the purposes of the model, each trip was allocated to a 1
o square location (an area of 
60x60 nautical miles (NM)) based on their latitude and longitude. For trips that straddled two 
or more areas, the middle area was used to represent the trip (this happened very rarely as 
most trips between shots were less around 30 NM, see Table 1). Areas with low observed 
effort levels (see Figure 1) were amalgamated with adjacent low effort areas, resulting in a 
total of 72 fishing areas. The magnitude of the data set, and the number of potential ports 
from  which  vessels  could  fish,  increased  the  complexity  of  the  data  set  required  for  the 
multinomial logit model. Consequently, only vessels operating from Mooloolaba were used 
in the model estimation. These vessels were active in 62 of the 72 fishing areas. 
 
The key area variables used in the analysis were average value per hook, and the average 
distance  to  the  home  port  (Mooloolaba)  multiplied  by  the  fuel  price  index  as  a  proxy 
indicator of fishing costs (on the assumption that both distance and fuel prices influenced the 
decision). The average distance of vessels fishing rather than the distance to the mid point of 
the area was used as this better reflected where the activity was taking place within the area. 
A second variable was estimated by dividing the average distance (multiplied by fuel prices) 
by the average number of days fished per trip by vessels operating in those areas, reflecting 
that distances further away may be compensated partially by a longer fishing trip (Holland 
and Sutinen 1999). The level of fishing effort (in number of trips) in each cell in the previous 
week and the previous year were also derived on the basis that fishers may use the activities 
of others in shaping their expectations. 
 
The average value per hook (VPH) deployed from each trip was estimated using the price and 
catch data, and the average of these for each area for each week was used to represent the 
expected revenue from fishing in a particular location. As the model estimation is based on 
expected, rather than realised, revenues, the values for the preceding week, and also same 
week in the preceding year, were used in the analysis. Where no fishing activity took place in 
a given week, the minimum value observed over the whole period of the data was used. The 
coefficient of variation in VPH was also included as a variable to capture any risk seeking or 
aversion behaviour. A negative parameter value on this variable would reflect risk aversion, 
while a positive parameter would reflect risk seeking behaviour (Holland and Sutinen 1999). 
 
                                                 
3 www.fuelwatch.wa.gov.au/ 
4 www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/meisubs.nsf/0/0C4B698A7E84A0D6CA25765C0019F682/$File/640101.xls  
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The key individual vessel characteristics included in the model involved the size of the vessel 
and its previous fishing activity. Smaller vessels are believed less likely to undertake trips 
offshore than their larger counterparts, mainly as they have a lower capacity for storage and 
lower fuel reserves. To allow for this, the distance variable (multiplied by price) was divided 
by the length of the vessel, with an a priori expectation that the sign of the coefficient for this 
variable would be negative (i.e. the probability of fishing further from port decreases as the 
vessel length decreases, and vice versa). Many other studies have found that past behaviour is 
also a key factor in determining future effort allocation (Holland and Sutinen 1999, 2000; 
Hutton et al. 2004). The location fished in the previous week and also in the same week the 
previous year was included for each vessel as dummy variables. This resulted in the loss of 
data for weeks in which the vessel did not fish the previous week,
5 or in that week the 
previous year. Also, the first year (2003) of the data was excluded as a lag of one year was 





5.1 Nested multinomial model 
 
The model was estimated as a nested multinomial logit model. Fishing areas were aggregated 
into 5 zones based on the aggregate effort allocation of all boats across the fishery: northern, 
central inshore, central offshore, southern inshore and southern offshore.
6 The inclusive value 
relating to the central inshore zone was normalised to 1 to avoid identification problems 
(Hensher et al. 2005). A normal multinomial specification of the model was also tested, with 
the  nested  model  having  a  lower  AIC  score.  Further,  the  inclusive  variable  values  were 
significantly greater than zero and significantly less than or equal to 1 (Table 3), suggesting a 
nested specification is more appropriate (Hensher et al. 2005). 
 
The  model  was  initially  run  with  location-specific  constants.  However,  these  were 
individually (and jointly) not significantly different from zero so were excluded from the 
subsequent models. Most of the parameters were significant, at least at the 10% level with 
many at the 1% level, with the exception of the variables representing location choice in the 
previous  week  and  year  (Table  3).  In  many  previous  studies,  location  choice  is  heavily 
influenced by previous  fishing locations. These studies have largely been based on trawl 
fisheries exploiting demersal finfish. While the main swordfish species targeted in the fishery 
have  a  residential  association  with  seamounts,  the  main  tuna  species  in  the  ETBF  are 
                                                 
5 Other studies have used a dummy variable to identify data for vessels that did not fish the previous week 
(Holland and Sutinen 1999, 2000).  
6 The last branch is degenerate as it contains only one alternative. As the alternative is specified at level two, the 
scale parameter is free to vary (Hensher et al. 2005).  
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migratory, largely following thermal eddies in the ocean.
7 These eddies follow a similar, but 
not identical pattern from year to year in terms of both timing and location. Further, fishers 
are able to obtain reliable information on where these eddies are at any point in time, so past 
fishing  activities  (generally  referred  to  as  “habits”,  (Holland  and  Sutinen  2000))  are  less 
important in this fishery than in others. The fishery is dynamic in other ways: relative prices 
between species have changed over the period of the data, while the availability of individual 
species varies considerably interannually, changing the value per hook. Given these changes, 
best locations in the past may not be as valuable in the future, and fishers may place little 
value on their past behaviour.
8 Excluding these variables slightly improved the model (in 
terms of the AIC). 
 
All the coefficients had the a priori expected signs. The utility (and hence the probability) of 
fishing in an area increased the higher the VPH in the previous week and year, and distant 
locations had a lower probability of being fished by smaller vessels than larger vessels. The 
parameter  on  the  coefficient  of  variation  was  positive  suggesting  risk  seeking  behaviour, 
similar to that observed in other studies (Holland and Sutinen 2000). 
 
Table 3. Estimated NL model parameters 
  All variables    Excluding “habit” variables 
Variable  Coeff  St. error 
Coeff/ 
St.Er.  P[Z>z]  Coeff  St. error 
Coeff/ 
St.Er.  P[Z>z] 
Utility model                 
VPH Week-1  0.188  0.007  27.26  ***  0.188  0.007  27.27  *** 
VPH Year-1  0.041  0.005  8.57  ***  0.041  0.005  8.56  *** 
Density Week-1  0.171  0.007  24.82  ***  0.171  0.007  24.84  *** 
Density Year-1  0.017  0.009  1.83  *  0.017  0.009  1.85  * 
Coeff. Variation  0.770  0.071  10.85  ***  0.772  0.071  10.88  *** 
P*distance  0.020  0.001  16.03  ***  0.020  0.001  16.03  *** 
P*distance/days  -0.002  0.001  -1.91  *  -0.002  0.001  -1.90  * 
P*distance/length  -0.418  0.024  -17.26  ***  -0.418  0.024  -17.26  *** 
Fished last week  -0.217  0.166  -1.31           
Fished last year  -0.005  0.153  -0.03           
Inclusive values                 
North  1.026  0.024  42.95  ***  1.027  0.024  43.02  *** 
Central inshore  1.000        1.000       
Central offshore  0.900  0.015  60.66  ***  0.901  0.015  60.75  *** 
South inshore  0.613  0.023  26.84  ***  0.613  0.023  26.87  *** 
South offshore  0.343  0.096  3.56  ***  0.345  0.096  3.60  *** 
Model diagnostics                 
Chi squared    6763.9        6762.1     
Log likelihood     -12461.5        -12462.4     
McFadden Pseudo R-squared   0.213        0.213     
AIC    7.1864        7.1857     
 
                                                 
7 Sea surface temperature is likely to influence the fishers’ expectations of catches and revenues, and would be a 
useful additional variable to include in the model. Such data were not available at the time of the analysis. 
8 This is also borne out in the relatively small impact of VPH the previous year on the expected utility of fishing 
in a given location compared with the VPH the previous week (Table 3).  
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The  model  estimated  effort  allocation  was  compared  with  the  actual  effort  allocation 
observed in 2008 (Figure 2). Correlation between actual and estimated effort allocation was 
reasonably high (r=0.73), although the model tended to overestimate effort in the northern 





















































































Figure 2. Actual and estimated distribution of fishing days, 2008 
 
Overall, the NL model provides a reasonable estimate of the allocation of fishing effort over 
the period of the data examined. While the McFadden Pseudo R
2 (McFadden 1974) was low, 
this was generally consistent with reported statistics in other studies of fisher location choice 
(Holland  and  Sutinen  1999;  Smith  2002;  Marchal  et  al.  2009).  Similarly,  the  correlation 
between actual and estimated effort allocation was equivalent, if not higher, than observed in 




The effect of a hook decrementation system on effort reallocation was estimated for two 
different  scenarios  to  examine  the  effectiveness  of  the  system  in  different  areas.  The 
sensitivity of these responses to fuel prices was also examined. Further, the effects of the 
hook decrementation system were also compared to those from a total closure of the areas. 
Only data relating to fishing trips for 2008 were used in the scenarios. The fleet was reduced 
substantially in 2005 and 2006 as part of a national fleet reduction program. The 2008 data 
reflects  the  current  fleet  situation,  so  provides  a  more  meaning  base  for  examining  the 
effectiveness of the incentive based system. 
 
In the first scenario, varying hook penalties were applied to four adjacent fishing areas (1
o 
grid cells) relatively close to port and characterised by high effort levels. The second scenario 
involved applying the penalties to four adjacent cells offshore. These were characterised by 
relatively low effort levels already. The inshore areas included in the scenario were  also  
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characterised by lower VPH than the offshore areas ($3.17/hook cf $4.70/hook), but also 
lower costs (the price*distance averaging 186 and 489 for the inshore and offshore areas 
respectively).  These  areas  were  selected  to  test  the  effectiveness  of  the  incentive  system 
under different cost/revenue conditions rather than representing any potential future policy 
implementation. 
 
The impact of the effort reallocation on revenue and fuel costs was also estimated for each 
scenario. The fuel cost change was represented by the additional distance travelled as a result 
of the hook penalty, assuming a linear relationship between distance to fishing area and fuel 
cost. Revenue was estimated based o the number of days fished in each area, the average 
number of hooks used, the average number of days per trip and the average VPH. 
 
In both scenarios, the proportional change in effort in the affected area was less than the 
effective change in VPH, indicating that effort allocation is relatively inelastic with respect to 
VPH (Table 4). The proportional response was greater in the inshore areas than the offshore 
areas. The offshore areas are primarily exploited by the larger vessels. From the multinomial 
model, these boats gain greater utility from operating in the distant locations than the smaller 
boats. 
 
For the high effort area, both total fishery revenue and costs increased as a result of the effort 
reallocation, while both decreased when the penalty was applied to the offshore area. Fuel 
costs  increased  by  a  greater  degree  with  the  inshore  penalty  as  vessels  moved  further 
offshore.  With  the  offshore  penalty,  fuel  costs  and  revenues  changed  by  about  the  same 
degree. In both cases, the profit implications of the effort allocation are likely to have been 
relatively minor, although greater for the inshore (high effort) area than the offshore (low 
effort) area. 
 
Table 4. Hook decrementation scenario results, 2008 data 
Area scenario  Hook penalty scenario 
  1.1  1.2  1.5  2  3 
Effective change in VPH (%)  -9  -17  -33  -50  -67 
Inshore (high effort)           
·  Change in days fished in affected area (%)  -5.24  -9.31  -17.44  -24.56  -30.81 
·  Change in total revenue (%)  0.18  0.32  0.60  0.85  1.06 
·  Change in total fuel costs (%)  0.59  1.04  1.95  2.74  3.43 
Offshore (low effort)           
·  Change in days fished in affected area (%)  -2.60  -4.63  -8.75  -12.42  -15.71 
·  Change in total revenue (%)  -0.01  -0.02  -0.04  -0.06  -0.07 
·  Change in total fuel costs (%)  -0.01  -0.02  -0.04  -0.06  -0.08 
 
For comparison, the NL model was used to estimate the effects of fully closing the areas 
rather than applying a hook penalty. As would be expected, effort reduction in the areas was 
substantially  greater than under the hook decrementation system, but the additional costs 
imposed  on  the  fleet  were  also  substantially  greater,  particularly  for  the  inshore  closure  
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scenario (Table 5). In contrast, closing the offshore areas had little impact on overall fishery 
economic performance, with less than 1% change in total fishery profits. This suggests that 
closures may be relatively efficient management tools in areas of low effort, but in areas of 
high  effort  may  impose  substantial  costs  on  the  industry  compared  with  incentive  based 
systems. 
 
Fuel prices in 2008 were substantially higher than previous years, and decreased by around 
30% in 2009. As utility generally decreased with distance from port (reflecting the higher 
fuel costs involved in reaching the more distant areas), it would be expected that the higher 
fuel prices would have pushed the fleet inshore, potentially reducing the effectiveness of the 
hook decrementation system in these areas. The model was re-run with a 30% reduction in 
fuel prices (affecting the three distance-related variables for the inshore area only to test the 
sensitivity of the policy to fuel prices. Counter to expectations, effort tended to increase in the 
inshore areas and decrease in the offshore areas (Figure 3). From Table 2, the effects of 
price*distance is effectively positive for boats over 21m in length, and negative for boats less 
than  21m  in  length  (i.e.  0.02*price*distance-0.418*price*distance/length  >0  for 
length>20.8m and <0 for length <20.8m). This results in a reduced incentive for smaller 
vessels to fish offshore, and a higher incentive for larger vessels, as expected a priori.. 
 
Table 5. Closure scenario results, 2008 data 
Area scenario  Closure areas 
  inshore  offshore 
·  Change in days fished in affected area (%)  -100  -100 
·  Change in total revenue (%)  3.49  -0.35 




























































































Figure 3. Change in days fished in each area due to a 30% reduction in fuel prices 
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The average length of Mooloolaba vessels is 22m (Table 1). While lower fuel costs may 
increase the probability of smaller vessels (<21m) venturing further from shore, larger vessels 
(more than half the fleet) would have a greater incentive to move inshore. This result is 
potentially an artefact of the model. However, the reduced fishing costs may also offset the 
lower VPH inshore, resulting in shorter total trips (including steaming  time that was not 
included in the data) and potentially higher overall profits 
 
The initial effort in the inshore areas to be subjected to the hook penalty increased from 70 to 
75 days as a result of the lower fuel costs. However, the proportional change in effort in 
response to the hook decrementation system was similar to that in the  scenario with the 
higher fuel prices (Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Hook decrementation scenario results with lower fuel prices, 2008 data 
Area scenario  Hook penalty scenario 
  1.1  1.2  1.5  2  3 
Effective change in VPH (%)  -9  -17  -33  -50  -67 
Inshore (high effort)           
·  Change in days fished in affected area (%)  -5.17  -9.21  -17.26  -24.33  -30.55 
·  Change in total revenue (%)  0.20  0.35  0.65  0.92  1.16 
·  Change in total fuel costs (%)  0.61  1.08  2.03  2.86  3.58 
 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Spatial management is becoming increasingly important as a fisheries management tool in 
Australia and elsewhere, particularly with respect to marine resource conservation (Pascoe et 
al. 2009). In most countries, spatial management has largely focused on marine protected 
areas (Wilen 2004), although there are a range of alternative spatial management tools that 
may achieve the desired conservation outcomes without a total closure of a fishing area. The 
hook  decrementation  system  examined  in  this  study  shares  similar  characteristics  to  a 
individual habitat quota system, in that spatial penalties can be assigned to effort expended in 
particular areas to encourage movement elsewhere (Holland and Schnier 2006).  
 
The results of the analysis suggest that a hook decrementation program is likely to be more 
successful in terms of effort reallocation when the penalties are applied to high effort areas 
than low effort. The attraction to the latter is fairly limited (hence the low level of effort), so 
making these areas less attractive is likely to have less of an impact. Conversely, high effort 
areas are attractive either due to their high VPH or low costs of access. In the case of the 
scenario examined above, the effort in the inshore areas was driven by both the low access 
cost and the VPH, which was also low relative to more offshore areas. Altering the effective 
VPH (i.e. increasing the opportunity cost of the hook quota consumed) in these areas resulted 
in a less than proportional decrease in fishing effort (with an implicit elasticity of around 0.5). 
In the offshore areas where access costs were substantially higher, the location choice by  
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those vessels that fished there appeared to be less related to VPH than other factors, resulting 
in a more inelastic effort response (an implicit elasticity of around 0.25) to the hook penalty. 
Given that these areas are not substantially “attractive” in any case, imposing a hook penalty 
has lesser impact than in the more “attractive” areas. 
 
Several forms of bycatch problems exist in the fishery, both in inshore and offshore waters. 
Interactions  with  turtles,  while  occurring  across  the  fishery,  are  highest  in  areas  close  to 
nesting beaches, particularly in the northern part of the fishery. Interactions with seabirds 
occur  in  the  central  offshore  zone  (fleshfooted  shearwater)  and  southern  inshore  zone 
(albatross).  These  areas  are  generally  characterised  by  high  effort  levels  as  they  also 
correspond  to  key  tuna  grounds  at  certain  times  of  the  year.  Given  this,  a  hook 
decrementation approach may help reduce fishing effort in the key interaction areas, although 
from the model results a high penalty may need to be imposed to result in a substantial effort 
reduction. 
 
Only a hook penalty was applied in the analysis. Potentially, hook “rewards” could also be 
applied to attract effort to particular areas. The Faroe Islands’ individual transferable effort 
quota system provides incentives for vessels to fish in offshore areas by allowing each quota 
day to equal three fishing days in these areas (i Jakupsstovu et al. 2007). Similarly, a hook 
penalty  of  less  than  1  could  be  applied  in  areas  where  bycatch  was  relatively  low  to 
encourage fishing in these areas. 
 
The  model  has  several  limitations,  not  the  least  of  which  is  the  availability  of  data. 
Expectations in the fishery are likely to be affected by sea surface temperature, and including 
this in the analysis may have improved the model fit. Heterogeneity in risk preferences has 
also  not  been  considered,  and  this  have  been  shown  to  affect  location  choice  elsewhere 
(Mistiaen and Strand 2000). The analysis treats each trip as an independent event, and the 
location choice is based on the prevailing conditions only. While this is seen as an advantage 
of the NL approach in most cases (Smith 2002), with an effort quota, trips are not completely 
independent as hook units used in one trip results in less quota being available for use in the 
subsequent trips.  In such a case, the response to the hook penalties may  be  greater than 
estimated using the model as the opportunity cost of using the additional hook units in the 
penalty areas is not fully considered. 
 
The analysis was also undertaken only for one fleet (defined by port) operating in the fishery. 
More southerly fleets may be more or less responsive to the economic incentives created by 
the policy, as they face a difference set of potential locations, with different costs of access. 
Analysis of these other fleets is still to be completed. 
 
Despite the potential model limitations, the model results suggest that a hook decrementation 
system has potential as a spatial management tool to redirect fishing effort from sensitive 
areas to less sensitive areas. However, high penalties may need to be applied to encourage  
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effort reallocation. For some areas, closures may still be considered necessary if bycatch rates 
are unacceptable even at lower fishing effort levels. Closures are effective as a conservation 
tool, but as seen from the model results may impose substantial costs on the fishery, even if 
effort can reallocate. However, in many cases, effort reduction rather than total exclusion 
may be sufficient to achieve the conservation objective, and a hook decrementation system 
allows the level of effort reduction to be “fine tuned” through changing the penalty structure. 
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